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CONFESSIONS AND THE COURT 
Stephen J. Schu/hofer* 
POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAW 
AND POLICY. By Yale Kamisar. Ann Arbor: University of Michi-
gan Press. 1980. Pp. xx, 323. $17.50. 
Collected in this volume are seven essays and law review articles, 
spanning sixteen eventful years of evolution, revolution, retrench-
ment, and just plain chaos in the jurisprudence of police interroga-
tion. Presented with scarcely any updating of text or references, 1 and 
with no overview of trends or themes, the book provides an easy 
target for the kinds of criticism that can be leveled at any collection 
of this sort. If anything, this collection is more vulnerable than most, 
because only two or three of the articles can be said to take a general 
problem in confessions as their starting point.2 Three of the others 
are commentaries on individual cases, with meticulous attention to 
particularities of the record or to opinions filed in concurrence and 
dissent;3 two articles are tributes to the work of colleagues;4 and one 
article still bears the marks of its origins in the lowly book review 
* Associate Professor of Law and Public Policy, University of Pennsylvania. A.B. 1964, 
Princeton University; LL.B. 1967, Harvard University. - Ed. 
I. Kamisar deleted the portions of one pre-Miranda article that discussed the implications 
of Escobedo, and made additions to eight out of well over a thousand end notes and footnotes. 
See Y. KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS viii, xii (1980) [hereinafter cited 
as KAMISAR EsSAYS without cross-reference]. 
2. Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure (originally 
published in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME 11 (A. Howard ed. 1965)), in KAMISAR EsSAYS 
at 27, addresses the fundamentals directly and with a breadth of vision matched by few articles 
in the field. What is an 'Involuntary' Confession? (originally published at 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 
728 (1963)), in KAMISAR EssAYS at I, provocatively explores the title question against the 
background of the law enforcement manual, F. INBAU & J. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 
AND CONFESSIONS 0962). The article began as a book review, p. xi, and much ofit is devoted 
to a close critique of lnbau and Reid's tendentious statement of the law. Brewer v. Williams, 
Massiah and Miranda: What is ''Interrogation"? When .Does it Matter? [hereinafter cited as 
What is Interrogation?] (originally published at 67 GEO. L.J. I (1978)), in KAMISAR EssAYS at 
139, is heavily rooted in the facts and opinions in Williams, though it proceeds well beyond 
them. 
3. A .Dissent from the Miranda .Dissents (originally published at 65 MICH. L. REV. 55 
(1966)), in KAMISAR EssAYS at 41; Brewer v. Williams-A Hard Look at a .Discomfiting Rec-
ord (originally published at 66 GEO. L.J. 209 (1977)), in KAMISAR EssAYS at 113; What is 
Interrogation?, supra note 2, in KAMISAR EssAYS at 139. 
4. Kauper's "Judicial Examination of the Accused" Forty Years Loter ( originally published 
at 73 MICH. L. REV. 15 (1974)), in KAMISAR EsSAYS at 77; Fred E. lnbau: "The Importance of 
Being Guilty" (originally published at 68 J. CRIM. & CRIMINOLOGY 182 (1977)), in KAMISAR 
EsSAYS at 95. 
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genre.5 
This unlikely mixture of ingredients nonetheless makes for a 
bubbling and thoroughly captivating brew. Each topic, however tied 
to events of the moment, triggers an explosion of questions, hy-
potheticals, analyses, and insights. Forgotten dissenting opinions 
and never-noticed details of trial testimony lead to larger problems 
that are anything but dated or obscure. The discussion constantly 
probes not just for "policy arguments" but for the facts, the raw facts 
underlying the polite abstractions. The articles survey the pros and 
cons but then let you know where the author stands, usually in no 
uncertain terms, and often in language that glows white hot with an 
indignation made more compelling by Kamisar's obvious awareness 
of countervailing arguments and his graciousness (usually) to the in-
dividuals who advance them. Along the way we find countless re-
freshing sidelights and anecdotes, a mini-history of the academic 
debates over police interrogation, and in effect, the intellectual auto-
biography of the person who, despite his generous praise for the con-
tributions of others, 6 was himself a leading force in the Miranda 
"revolution" of the 1960s. 
A book so rich, so full of life, will not easily bear a summary, 
seriatim, of its constituent parts. It provides a mine of information, 
stimulation, and insight that will have countless different uses for 
students and teachers, lawyers and judges, reformers and scholars. 
For me it prompted many questions about how and why the various 
confessions doctrines have developed to their present point, how well 
those doctrines satisfy the diverse demands that are properly im-
posed upon them, and how the constraints of the judicial function 
have affected and should affect the evolving content of the overall 
package of doctrinal principles. What follows are some thoughts on 
these matters suggested by Kamisar's immensely stimulating work. 
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON POLICE 
INTERROGATION 
Three independent constitutional doctrines have played a role in 
limiting police interrogation and related prosecution efforts to obtain 
incriminating information from suspects: the due process clause 
5. What is an "Involuntary" Coefession?, in KAMISAR EsSAYS at l; see note 2 supra, 
6. Kamisar lauds Bernard Weisberg for drawing attention to the interrogation manuals 
that proved so influential in Escobedo and Miranda, pp. 62 n.19, 109-10; he credits Claude 
Sowle with inspiring his own truly inspired Gatehouses and Mansions article, pp. 106-07, 256 
n.62; and attributes much of Miranda's conceptual foundation to the "magnificent" American 
Civil Liberties Union brief authored by Anthony Amsterdam and Paul Mishkin, pp. 49 n.11, 
109, 163 n.30. 
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(with its associated requirement of "voluntariness"); the fifth amend-
ment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination (with its as-
sociated Miranda safeguards); and the sixth amendment right to the 
assistance of counsel.7 I will consider these in tum. 
A. The .Due Process "Voluntariness" Test 
In a series of cases beginning in 1936, 8 the Supreme Court held 
that the admission in a state criminal trial of an "involuntary" con-
fession violates due process. The early cases required exclusion of 
such confessions primarily (and perhaps exclusively) because of their 
unreliability, but as the course of adjudication proceeded, it became 
clear that confessions would be held "involuntary" and hence inad-
missible, even when their reliability was clearly established. Indeed 
in 1961, in Rogers v. Richmond,9 the Supreme Court held that a court 
assessing a voluntariness claim could not even tonsider the fact that 
the police tactics would not tend to produce a false confession. 10 The 
Court did not, however, get very far in its efforts to articulate pre-
cisely what factors did render a confession involuntary or what poli-
cies supported the exclusion of involuntary confessions. The 
opinions condemned "overbearing the will," as revealed by "the to-
tality of the circumstances." They justified the condemnation as a 
response to "fundamental unfairness" 11 or because "ours is . . . not 
an inquisitorial system."12 There was virtually nothing more to go 
on. In 1961, Justice Frankfurter, in an ambitious attempt to lay bare 
the fundamentals, identified two competing policies: first, that 
"questioning suspects is indispensable to law enforcement" and thus 
"whatever reasonable means are needed to make the questioning ef-
fective must be conceded to the police"; 13 but second, that "the terri-
7. One other doctrine, the fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, has lurked in the background of cases involving the use of secret agents and surrepti-
tious recording to obtain information. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), does not 
entirely settle the constitutionality of such tactics, because the plurality opinion in White, in 
holding justified the imposition of a risk of betrayal, relies heavily on the possibility that if a 
defendant "sufficiently doubts [a companion's] trustworthiness, the association will very prob-
ably end or never materialize." 401 U.S. at 752. It seems far from clear whether this reasoning 
can fairly be extended to custodial situations in which a secret agent is posing as a defendant's 
cell mate. q: United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1346 (9th Cir. 1977) (upholding eaves-
dropping, without consent of either party, but only under circumstances reasonably necessary 
for maintaining prison security), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978). Fourth amendment 
problems related to confessions are not addressed by Kamisar and will not be pursued here. 
8. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). 
9. 365 U.S. 534 (1961). 
10. 365 U.S. at 543-44. 
I 1. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941). 
12. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961). 
13. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 578-79 (1961) (plurality opinion). 
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ble engine of the criminal law is not to be used to overreach 
individuals who stand helpless against it . . . . [M]en are not to be 
exploited for the information necessary to condemn them .... " 14 
He described the voluntariness test as an effort to strike a balance 
between these two opposite "poles."15 
Kamisar's first interrogation article, What Is an Involuntary Con-
fession?, exposes the contradictions underlying Frankfurter's ap-
proach and calls for a new departure. Drawing on police 
interrogation manuals. Kamisar sketches a vivid picture of the inter-
rogation techniques recommended by responsible police educators 
and of the sophisticated theories of psychological manipulation un-
derlying those techniques. He makes clear that "reasonable means 
. . . to make the questioning effective" and "overreach[ing] individ-
uals who stand helpless" are not opposite poles but more often "in-
tersecting circles": 
If the police may tear suspects from their homes, friends and neigh-
bors, put them in an "interrogation room" without informing them of 
their right to keep silent, and shut out the "outside," they can "exploit" 
suspects for information "necessary to condemn them," can they not? 
. . . Evidently an uncounselled, uninformed suspect all alone in an 
interrogation room is not deemed "helpless" . . . . At what point is he 
rendered "helpless" or "exploitable?" [Pp. 13-14.] 
Using a brilliant four-part hypothetical (pp. 15-20), Kamisar 
shows that the old voluntariness terminology, with its focus on 
"breaking the will," was not only unhelpful but misleading. He 
demonstrates that neither of the two critical concerns - the offen-
siveness of the police behavior and the tendency of the interrogation 
methods to produce a false confession - had focused or should fo-
cus primarily on the subjective mental condition of the particular 
defendant. The essay does not attempt to sketch all the answers but 
instead ends with a call for discarding the obfuscating language of 
voluntariness and starting to address the underlying concerns more 
directly. 
Events quickly overtook efforts to sharpen the old due process 
test, and when Kamisar returned to the subject in later essays his 
objective was not so much to explicate the due process test as to show 
its elusiveness and its inherent unworkability. In a scathing attack 
on the opinions filed by the dissenters in Miranda (pp. 41-76), 
Kamisar invites us to ponder their claim that the voluntariness stan-
dard represented "a workable and effective means of dealing with 
14. 367 U.S. at 581. 
15. 367 U.S. at 578, 581. 
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confessions in a judicial manner." 16 His review of cases decided 
under that standard before Miranda, his selection of the dissenters' 
own earlier characterizations of the standard ("elusive, measure-
less," 17 "uncertain" and "unpredictable," 18 "we do not shape the 
conduct of local police one whit" 19), and his telling statistics about 
the realities of Supreme Court review (very few confessions issues 
won Supreme Court consideration in noncapital cases, and even in 
capital cases only one out of four petitioners was granted a hearing 
(p. 75), serve to expose the central premise of the dissenters' argu-
ment as altogether unconvincing if not mildly ridiculous. 
Adding up the diverse strands of criticism developed by Kamisar 
and others, one finds roughly six defects in the due process volunta-
riness test: 
I. The standard left police without needed guidance. Because of 
its vagueness and its insistence on assessing "the totality of the cir-
cumstances," the voluntariness standard gave no guidance to police 
officers seeking to ascertain what questioning tactics they could use. 
Indeed, at the critical point when the police sensed that a suspect was 
about to "crack," they were enjoined to be on guard against both 
"overbearing the will" and losing their chance by lessening the ten-
sion or pressure; in many common situations the message of the due 
process test was not just vague but inherently contradictory. Under 
these circumstances, moreover, exclusion of improperly obtained 
confessions was an unsatisfactory remedy: the defendant's physical 
or psychological injury was not redressed, the exclusion did virtually 
nothing to deter similar police abuses in the future, and society lost 
the benefit of a statement that might have been obtained anyway had 
the police been forewarned to avoid the tactics eventually ruled im-
proper.20 
2. The standard impaired the e.ffectiveness and the legitimacy of 
judicial review. The vagueness of the voluntariness test spawned sev-
eral interrelated difficulties for the courts. Not only were conscien-
tious trial judges left without guidance for resolving confession 
16. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 506 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also 384 
U.S. at 503 (Clark, J., concurring and dissenting) (advocating a "totality of the circumstances" 
test of voluntariness). 
17. Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 455 (1961) (Clark, J., dissenting). 
18. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 138 (1954) (Clark, J., concurring). 
19. 347 U.S. at 139 (Clark, J., concurring). 
20. But see Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952), where a confession obtained after 
police kicked and threatened a suspect was held admissible on the ground that the police 
conduct was not a causal factor triggering the confession. Cf. Commonwealth v. Mahnke, 368 
Mass. 662, 335 N.E.2d 660 (1975) (severe coercion did not taint a subsequent confession), cert. 
denied, 425 U.S. 969 (1976). See note 52 infra. 
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claims but they were virtually invited to give weight to their subjec-
tive preferences when performing the elusive task of balancing. 
Judges unsympathetic to constitutional values, or concerned about 
the release of a dangerous offender, might not adhere to the evolving 
constitutional standard. Appellate courts theoretically could correct 
erroneous trial court judgments, but similar attitudes inclined many 
appellate judges to permit interrogation tactics that should have 
been condemned under applicable Supreme Court precedent. There 
was ample evidence that such disregard of established principles was 
serious and pervasive.21 Effective appellate control therefore re-
quired either active Supreme Court review - an impossibility in our 
judicial system - or active intervention by federal courts granting 
habeas corpus - a technique that was inhibited to a degree by the 
same subjective attitudes and that was unhealthy for the federal sys-
tem when it worked.22 
In any event, inadequate judicial sensitivity to constitutional 
rights was not the most fundamental part of the problem. The ambi-
guity of the due process test and its subtle mixture of factual and 
legal elements discouraged active review even by the most conscien-
tious appellate judges. Moreover, when higher courts did attempt to 
address confessions questions, they found themselves so wholly at 
sea that the appearance of principled judicial decision-making inevi-
tably suffered, whether or not they chose to hold the confession inad-
missible. The Supreme Court, which has special reasons to guard 
the objectivity and perceived legitimacy of its processes, was particu-
larly vulnerable to institutional damage on this ground.23 The dam-
age simply could not be contained by Justice Frankfurter's eloquent 
insistence that the ad hoc due process approach was nothing but a 
"disinterested inquiry pursued in the spirit of science."24 Had the 
Court' been willing to hear more confessions cases, the threat to its 
legitimacy and prestige probably would have been aggravated by the 
very actions that were at the same time necessary to exert more eff ec-
tive control over the lower courts. 
3. Application of the standard was fatally dependent upon resolu-
tion of "the swearing contest. " Even if the content of the voluntari-
21. See Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 785, 806-08 (1970). 
22. q: Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 351 n.5 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring) (not-
ing that state courts are charged with front-line responsibility for enforcing constitutional 
rights). 
23. See Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in J)ue Process Adjudication - A Survey and 
Criticism, 66 YALE LJ. 319 (1957). 
24. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). 
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ness test had been more precise, its application would remain 
dependent on fact-finding about events that inevitably occurred in 
secret, with the suspect isolated and often disoriented, distraught, or 
confused. At trial, there was little to prevent police from describing 
the interrogation in terms consciously or unconsciously slanted to 
favor admissibility of the confession. The defendant could do little 
more than present his version, leaving it to the judge or jury to de-
cide the relative credibility of the two sides to this "swearing con-
test." And there was next to nothing to prevent judges and juries 
from systematically resolving credibility isssues in favor of the po-
lice. Indeed, it was likely that any fact-finder, no matter how skepti-
cal of police testimony, would tend to credit that testimony over the 
claims of a suspect whose perceptions probably were not acute, 
whose incentive to fabricate was even stronger than that of the po-
lice, and whose ability to supply corroborating facts was usually nil. 
Under these circumstances no one could know whether the "facts" 
evaluated in court corresponded to the events that actually had oc-
curred in the interrogation room. 25 
4. Considerable interrogation pressure was allowed. Although 
the amount of pressure to confess tolerated by the courts seemed to 
be steadily diminishing, the voluntariness test clearly did authorize 
considerable pressure. Indeed, the conception of voluntariness in-
directly encouraged police to pressure suspects because it viewed po-
lice efforts to persuade a reticent suspect to talk as legitimate and 
highly desirable.26 Of course, defenders of the voluntariness test did 
not regard this particular feature as a defect. But for those who sup-
ported the principle of the fifth amendment privilege against com-
pulsory self-incrimination, and who failed to see why "compulsion" 
within the meaning of the privilege should be narrowly defined as a 
formal, legal obligation to speak, the allowance of substantial police 
pressure under the voluntariness test was anomalous and wrong.27 
5. The weak were manipulated The voluntariness test ostensi-
bly took account of special weaknesses of the person interrogated, 
but because it did permit the use of substantial pressures, suspects 
who were ignorant of their rights, unsophisticated about police prac-
25. Of course, all judicial fact-finding is to some extent vulnerable to the vagaries of a 
swearing contest. But once the courts affirmed police authority to exclude any potential ob-
server from the interrogation setting, the one-sidedness of the swearing contest in confession 
cases could no longer be seen as fortuitous or inevitable. 
26. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 509 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Culombe v. 
Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 578-80 (1961) (plurality opinion). 
27. The argument is forcefully developed in Kamisar's Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and 
Mansions of American Criminal Procedure. P. 27. 
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tices and court procedures, easily dominated, or otherwise psycho-
logically vulnerable were more likely to be on the losing end of a 
successful police interrogation. Indeed even in theory, the voluntari-
ness test favored the more sophisticated suspect because it probably 
did not permit greater-than-average pressure against the stronger-
than-average defendant.28 The ·appearance of advantage for the 
more sophisticated took on overtones of discrimination against racial 
minorities or the poor. This discomfort with the voluntariness test 
was sometimes mislabelled and too readily dismissed as an "equal 
protection" claim,29 but the objection was not based on equal protec-
tion doctrine. Rather, the point was simply that we do (and should) 
find it unseemly for government officials systematically to seek out 
and take advantage of the psychological vulnerabilities of a citizen.30 
Whether or not one considers such tactics necessary for effective law 
enforcement, they convey a feeling of manipulation and exploitation 
of the weak by the powerful that many would tolerate with at best 
considerable reluctance. 
6. Physical brutality was not adequately checked. Of course, the 
voluntariness test prohibited physical violence and other extreme 
forms of abuse. But by permitting the use of "some" pressure, this 
approach encouraged the questioning process itself. Indeed, while 
courts occasionally mentioned a preference for evidence produced 
"by the independent labor of [police] officers,"31 the voluntariness 
test reinforced the idea that an effective police officer is one who 
succeeds (by "fair" means) in obtaining a confession from the sus-
pect. Unfortunately, after several hours of questioning, "slowing 
mounting fatigue does . . . play its part"32 in weakening the officer. 
His will - to comply with the law - may be "overborne" by impa-
tience, frustration, or the persistence of a stubborn suspect who re-
fuses to "come clean." It should not have been surprising that 
sincere, dedicated investigators, intent on solving brutal crimes, oc-
casionally lost their tempers. 33 
* * * 
28. See pp. 23-24. 
29. See J)evelopments in the Law, Confessions, 19 HARV. L. REV. 938, 1018 (1966). 
30. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,455 (1966) ("Even without employing brutality 
. . . or the specific strategems described above, the very fact of custodial interrogation • • • 
trades on the weaknesses of individuals."). 
31. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 582 (1961) (plurality opinion). 
32. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 322 (1959). 
33. q. 8 J. WrGMORE, EVIDENCE 309 (3d ed. 1940) (''The exercise of the power to extract 
answers begets a forgetfulness of the just limitations of that power. The simple and peaceful 
process of questioning breeds a readiness to resort to bullying and to physicial force and tor-
ture."). 
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The shortcomings of the voluntariness standard are of more than 
merely historical interest for two reasons. First, that standard re-
mains the principal basis for adjudication in various confessions sit-
uations not governed by Miranda. 34 Second, and perhaps more 
important, law enforcement authorities continue to press vigorously 
for the overruling of Miranda;35 though a majority of the present 
Court seems unprepared to take that step yet, the Justices' percep-
tions of the usefulness of the due process test undoubtedly condition 
their willingness incrementally to expand the domain of that test by 
very restrictive interpretations of Miranda. 
The re-publication of Kamisar's early articles on the voluntari-
ness test is therefore timely, and his work on that subject can usefully 
be compared to the new crop of due process proposals generated by 
the Court's evident discomfort with Miranda. Professor Joseph 
Grano, in a particularly thorough study, has probed the difficult con-
ceptual foundations of voluntariness discourse and has identified 
several elements that courts should highlight in a sensitive due pro-
cess analysis. 36 Such studies are extremely useful, but insofar as they 
propose a return to exclusive reliance on the voluntariness test, con-
ceived primarily as an individualized balancing of competing inter-
ests, they fail, in my judgment, to come to grips with the central 
defects of that approach. Such proposals largely ignore the impor-
tance, for effective law enforcement as well as for the accused, of 
providing clear guidance to the police. They bypass the difficulties 
of "the swearing contest," downplay the manipulation of the weak,37 
and overlook the dangers of encouraging actual physical abuse of 
suspects. 
Professor Grano's study does argue directly for the use of signifi-
cant interrogation pressures and for the feasibility of judicial review. 
But even his comprehensive analysis seems to leave a great deal un-
said concerning these problems. To assess the permissible degree of 
pressure, for example, Grano develops a test cast in terms of whether 
a person of ordinary firmness would yield to the pressures deployed, 
34. See text accompanying notes 53-56 infra. 
35. q. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387,438 (1977) (Black.mun, J., dissenting) (noting that 
petitioner and 21 states and others, as amici curiae, had urged overruling of Miranda). 
36. Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will, and the Law of Co,!fessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 859 (1979). 
37. Grano, for example, recognizes that some personal characteristics of suspects must be 
considered, but also emphasizes that since the objective of interrogation is to overcome unwill-
ingness to speak, not every weakness can be taken into account. Id. at 901. He concludes that 
physical or mental illness and extreme youth or old age should be considered, but that "social 
adversity, peculiar personality traits, abnormal temperament, or low intelligence" should not 
be considered: "We expect an individual to overcome these conditions or characteristics." Id. 
at 904. 
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and proposes that cases be judged in terms of what "[o]ur common 
experience tells us"38 about the effect of interrogation pressures on 
the average person.39 Unfortunately, Grano's standard of "ordinary 
firmness," though imaginatively patterned on the law of duress and 
not transposed without caveats,40 seems much more misleading than 
helpful in the confessions context.41 And the "common experience" 
of most judges, lawyers, and law professors will seldom give them a 
feel for the impact of persistent questioning in a custodial environ-
ment. A balancing analysis structured in this way cannot provide a 
principled means to gauge the pressures deployed or to evaluate on a 
case-by-case basis how much pressure should be constitutionally ac-
ceptable. 
Sanguine predictions for the reliability of judicial review under 
the new voluntariness proposals suffer similar shortcomings. They 
are not buttressed by live examples from recent litigation, and they 
simply do not square with the sad lessons of actual experience with 
the ostensibly objective analysis of the pre-Miranda standard. Even 
in close confessions cases where a conscientious court legitimately 
could rule either way, the voluntariness standard impaired sound ju-
dicial administration: it prevented appropriate appellate control of 
the trier of fact, and at best left an appearance of inconsistent, un-
38. Id. at 898. 
39. See id. at 896-99. 
40. See id. at 899, 906-07. 
41. Reference to the "ordinary firmness" standard in the law of duress conceivably might 
suggest either: (I) a benchmark against which to judge the allowable quantum of pressure; 
(2) a framework for structuring moral discourse about the pressures one can be expected to 
resist; or (3) a source of evidence that such a standard is not too elusive for satisfactory admin-
istration. Grano explicitly disclaims the first suggestion, id. at 899, and rightly so: in substan-
tive criminal law, even threats of substantial bodily harm may be insufficient to establish a 
duress defense, particularly when the charge is homicide. The third suggestion is untenable 
because the open-ended duress standard is intended for application by juries on an ad hoc, 
intuitive basis; Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), forecloses that method of adjudication 
for confessions claims. 
The second suggestion is the most plausible, but it is nonetheless flawed. In the substantive 
law of duress the standard of "ordinary firmness" prescribes a moral norm: one ought to resist 
certain pressures because the failure to do so causes harm to other people. As a result, the 
analysis of what one ought to do, though informed by perceptions about average capacities, 
can be rooted in comparisons of relative harms and available alternatives. This kind of moral 
discourse is wholly out of place in a voluntariness analysis. To speak of"the effort and resist-
ance that reasonably can be expected of suspects in custody," Grano, supra note 36, al 907, 
overlooks the absence of any moral notion that one ought to resist, in the interests of society, or 
that one who fails to resist should be condemned for an antisocial act. From a social viewpoint 
the suspect should confess; he is not expected but rather entitled to resist, and ordinarily he 
does resist at the outset. We do not have a coherent moral notion of what it would mean to say 
that the suspect was ''unreasonable" when he ceased his resistance and confessed. (From his 
own point of view, of course, a suspect's decision to confess to the police is always unreasona-
ble.) 
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principled decision-making.42 Moreover, the problems of effective 
judicial control were by no means confined to the close cases, as nu-
merous truly shocking decisions attest. Lengthy confinement incom-
municado, for example, is mentioned by Professor Grano as a factor 
that would strongly suggest involuntariness under his analysis. He 
cites .Davis v. North Carolina43 and several earlier cases as confirm-
ing examples.44 But Kamisar provides a careful review of the litiga-
tion history of .Davis, showing that before the Supreme Court 
reversed Davis's conviction, the North Carolina courts, the federal 
district court on habeas, and the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit all had held that the confession in this capital case 
was not involuntary (pp. 43-44, 73-76). And .Davis was far from an 
isolated example. To choose just one other, let me avoid the South 
and pick on my own home state, where in the Kern case a Penn-
sylvania appellate court held voluntary a confession obtained after 
interrogators forced the suspect to strip naked.45 Grano points to 
this factor as one that also would strongly suggest involuntariness 
under his approach.46 Indeed, as early as 1945 the Supreme Court 
had roundly condemned the tactic in Malinski v. New York.47 Nev-
ertheless, the Pennsylvania court never referred to Malinski, and the 
opinion explained the voluntariness finding only in a brief passage 
so mind-boggling48 that the reader can scarcely believe it was written 
only eighteen months before the Supreme Court's decision in Esco-
bedo v. Illinois.49 Unlike .Davis, Kern was not a death penalty case 
(the robbery conviction merely yielded Kem a sentence of not less 
than seventeen years nor more than thirty-seven years), and both the 
Pennsylvania and United States Supreme Courts denied review. 
Conceivably, such miscarriages of justice would be less likely to-
42. See text following note 22 supra. 
43. 384 U.S. 737 (1966). 
44. Grano, supra note 36, at 908. 
45. Commonwealth ex rel Kern v. Banmiller, 187 A.2d 185 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1962), cert. 
denied, 374 U.S. 852 (1963). 
46. Grano, supra note 36, at 908. 
47. 324 U.S. 401, 407 (1945). 
48. It is true that the F.B.I. officers stripped Kern of his clothes in making a search of 
him immediately after being taken to the police station. This was testified to be standard 
practice and the reasons given therefor. It is not denied that after this took place, Kern 
was permitted to put on his underwear, and it was in this condition that the statement was 
obtained. Counsel for Kern now contends that this was psychological coercion. Amaz-
ingly, Kern himself never referred to this as being a cause for giving or signing any al-
leged confession. The officers testified that there was no beating and abuse . . . . 
Commonwealth ex rel Kern v. Banmiller, 187 A.2d 185, 190 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1962), cert. de-
nied, 374 U.S. 852 (1963). 
49. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
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day. The Supreme Court now believes that, at least in search-and-
seizure cases, judicial insensitivity to constitutional rights is largely a 
thing of the past.50 In confessions cases it is much harder to say 
whether such attitudes have changed, because Miranda has dis-
placed the voluntariness analysis in the most frequently litigated sit-
uations. Several important differences between search-and-seizure 
litigation and confessions cases suggest the need for caution before 
concluding that state courts would apply an open-ended voluntari-
ness test in the appropriate spirit.51 Indeed, among the relatively few 
voluntariness cases still litigated, there are enough contemporary 
horribles to suggest that the problems of effective appellate review 
remain acute.52 The claim that a due process approach can provide 
50. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-94 n.35 (1976). For discussion of the applicabil-
ity of Stone to Miranda claims, see text at notes 102-20 infra. 
51. Among the many possible areas of difference, two particularly worth exploring are 
judicial attitudes toward the underlying right and the clarity of operative legal principles. On 
the first point, freedom from unreasonable search and seizure has been recognized in principle 
at least since Wolfv. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); see also Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 
383 (1914) (first applying the exclusionary rule in the federal courts). In contrast, a suspect's 
right to terminate a custodial interrogation was not recognized even in theory until Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and understanding of the nature and importance of this right 
may not yet have penetrated the judiciary to the same extent as understanding of the fourth 
amendment. 
The second point is much less speculative. Fourth amendment jurisprudence has long 
since diverged from weighing the totality of the facts to determine whether a search was "un-
reasonable." q: Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 432-35 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting) 
( criticizing the Court's refusal to follow the lower court's use of the totality of the circum-
stances test). Because the governing rules usually leave appellate courts free to render judg-
ment de novo, the doctrines permit effective control over the trial bench, where concern about 
the crime and corresponding insensitivity to constitutional rights are likely to be greatest. The 
voluntariness test, in contrast, is much more closely tied to a factual assessment. The trial 
court's finding on the ultimate issue plainly is reviewable, but when an evaluation of the par-
ticular defendant's subjective state of mind is central to the mixed issue of fact and law, the 
reviewing court will (and ordinarily should) defer heavily to the trier of fact. The ensuing 
difficulties for a conscientious reviewing court are vividly illustrated by Commonwealth v. 
Mahnke, 368 Mass. 662,335 N.E.2d 660 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976). See note 52 
infra. In practice, inadequate sensitivity to constitutional rights at the trial court level is much 
more difficult to identify and to remedy in voluntariness cases than it is in search and seizure 
cases. 
52. State v. Taylor, 112 Ariz. 68, 537 P.2d 938 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 921 (1976), 
involved a sixteen-year-old suspect who apparently had not gone beyond the eighth grade and 
whose intelligence was described as "borderline." In connection with an investigation of a 
hotel fire in which 28 persons died, Taylor was arrested at about 2:30 a.m., given his Miranda 
warnings, and then questioned continuously for seven hours by a team of nine interrogators. 
He made a series of confused and inconsistent statements which were later introduced against 
him, leading to conviction on 28 counts of first-degree murder. The Arizona Supreme Court 
held the statements voluntary, explaining that "we are impressed by the fact that despite this 
alleged overwhelming atmosphere, the appellant never confessed to anything. He continued 
through an ever changing pattern of fabrications to protest his innocence ..•• " 112 Ariz. at 
81, 537 P.2d at 951. 
Co=onwealth v. Mahnke, 368 Mass. 662, 335 N.E.2d 660 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 
959 (1976), involved a murder suspect who was kidnapped by four relatives and friends of the 
victim, driven to a secluded hunting cabin and severely beaten. Beginning at 6:00 a.m. the 
next morning, he was interrogated continuously for over six hours and was repeatedly 
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"a workable and effective means of dealing with confessions in a 
judicial manner"53 is no more plausible today than when Kamisar 
wrote his caustic "dissent" from the Miranda dissents fifteen years 
ago. 
Kamisar's attack on the emptiness of the due process test no 
doubt diverted his interest from the questions raised in his first arti-
cle about how that test ideally should be interpreted. His failure to 
return to that problem is nonetheless unfortunate, because even 
while Miranda survives, its safeguards are simply inapplicable in 
many important situations. These situations include police question-
ing of suspects not in custody54 and questioning by private parties 
even when suspects are in a custody-like situation. 55 A Miranda 
claim is also unavailable in certain significant procedural contexts, 
even when the evidence involved is concededly the fruit of custodial 
police interrogation.56 In all these situations, the primary criterion 
of admissibility under current law is the "old" due process voluntari-
ness test. 
Because the due process test is still very much with us, Kamisar's 
convincing demolition of it works one regrettable and undoubtedly 
unintended disservice. Police Interrogation and Co,!fessions may 
tend to reinforce impressions often conveyed elsewhere that Miranda 
marked the death of the due process test and that, at least for the 
threatened with death. Finally he admitted killing the victim and agreed to lead his captors to 
her body. The trial judge found that the statements made in the cabin were inadmissible but 
held that subsequent statements and actions leading to discovery of the body later the same 
afternoon were voluntary because once the defendant had admitted his involvement, "a spirit 
of relative friendliness supplanted the former hostile, strained relationships between the de-
fendant and his captors." 368 Mass. at 672, 335 N.E.2d at 667. The Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court affirmed, relying heavily on its duty to abide by the trial judge's findings of fact; 
although the defendant had testified that he made the afternoon statements unwillingly, the 
trial judge chose not to believe this testimony. In one dissent, Justice Kaplan argued that the 
trial judge's "finding" that by afternoon the defendant was "completely free from fear" was 
"merely [a] reformulation in other words of the judge's conclusion .... " 368 Mass. at 706 
n.2, 335 N.E.2d at 686 n.2 (Kaplan, J., dissenting). However, another dissenter, Justice Hen-
nessey, viewed Justice Kaplan's approach as intruding on the trial court's prerogatives to ap-
praise witness credibility and attempted instead to argue for reversal on a burden of proof 
theory. See 368 Mass. at 727-28, 335 N.E.2d at 697-98 (Hennessey, J., dissenting). 
See also State v. Mincey, 115 Ariz. 472, 566 P.2d 273 (1977), revd sub nom. Mincey v. 
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978). 
53. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 506 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
54. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977). 
55. E.g., Commonwealth v. Mahnke, 368 Mass. 662, 335 N.E.2d 660 (1975), cert. denied, 
425 U.S. 959 (1976), discussed in note 52 supra. The "private party" exception is sometimes 
extended to private security guards who act in a semi-official law enforcement capacity. E.g., 
Schaumberg v. State, 83 Nev. 372, 432 P.2d 500 (1967). 
56. E.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (statement elicited in violation of Mi-
randa may be used to impeach the defendant's trial testimony). 
878 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 79:865 
time being, it remains buried.57 Careful attention to the voluntari-
ness issue remains an imperative, though sometimes overlooked, ob-
ligation of court and counsel,58 and careful scholarly attention to the 
voluntariness c_ase law that has developed since 1966 is long over-
due.59 
B. The Ff/th Amendment 
The crux of Miranda was not so much the now-famous warnings 
but rather the Court's holding that:60 
· all the principles embodied in the [Fifth Amendment] privilege apply 
to informal compulsion exerted by law enforcement officers during in-
custody questioning. An individual swept from familiar surroundings 
into police custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected 
to the techniques of persuasion described above cannot be otherwise 
than under compulsion to speak .... 61 
From this premise the Miranda Court proceeded to articulate the 
safeguards necessary (at least in the absence of equally effective leg-
islative remedies62) to dispel the inherently compelling pressures of 
custodial interrogation and to assure respect for the suspect's fifth 
amendment privilege. Before any questioning, the Miranda Court 
held, suspects must be warned about their rights to remain silent and 
to consult counsel. If a suspect indicates a desire to remain silent 
57. See, e.g., Grano, supra note 36, at 863. The leading casebook discusses the content of 
the voluntariness test only as part of the historical background of Miranda and does not pres-
ent any judicial opinions applying the test. See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, Moo-
ERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 543-665 (5th ed. 1980). 
58. A recent example is United States v. Mesa, 638 F.2d 582 (3d Cir. 1980). The defendant 
had barricaded himself in a motel room and threatened that he would not surrender peacea• 
bly. While 25 to 30 officers surrounded the motel, an F.B.I. crisis negotiator allempted to 
persuade the defendant to surrender and in the process obtained incriminating statements. A 
Miranda claim was rejected because one judge found no "custody" and a second found no 
"interrogation." Both views are based on particularities of Miranda's rationale and would by 
no means preclude a voluntariness claim. Yet the defense never argued, and so the court never 
considered, whether the statements made by this psychologically distraught suspect, on the 
verge of suicide, in the course of a three-and-one-half hour conversation under highly charged 
circumstances, were admissible under the due process test. 
59. Aspects of the post-Miranda voluntariness problem have been explored in White, Po-
lice Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 581 (1979), and in Dix, Mistake, 
Ignorance, Expectation of Benefit and the Modern Law of Confessions, 1975 WASH. U. L.Q. 275. 
60. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461 (1966). 
61. With this step the Court made a definitive break with the doctrinal and conceptual 
premises of the due process approach. Although the fifth amendment language of compulsion 
is not obviously different from the due process conception of "overbearing" the will, the reli-
ance on the fifth amendment implied that the need for effective ways of obtaining statements 
and the need to avoid overreaching the suspect could no longer be seen as equally important 
concerns. Instead, by viewing the problem in fifth amendment terms, the Court made clear (at 
least in principle) that protection against compulsory self-incrimination was not to be balanced 
against other legitimate social interests. 
62. 384 U.S. at 444, 467. 
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("in any manner, at any time"63) then all questioning must cease. If 
a suspect chooses to speak, the state bears a "heavy burden" of prov-
ing that the suspect ".knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege 
against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed 
counsel."64 
Miranda was, of course, sharply condemned by law enforcement 
officials. The civil liberties community, by and large, welcomed the 
decision as a major victory.65 Kamisar's first response noted that 
some aspects of the decision would have to be clarified (p. 42), sug-
gested that the Court had perhaps gone too far in one respect, 66 and 
concentrated its fire on exposing (with great force and effectiveness) 
the many inadequacies in the dissenting opinions. But how much 
had Miranda actually accomplished? To what extent had it solved 
the specific problems that made the voluntariness approach so unsat-
isfactory? It is of course much easier to answer these questions now 
than it was in 1966, but some serious shortcomings should have been 
apparent from the outset. 
On the plus side, Miranda certainly provided plenty of guidance 
for the police. There was some potential ambiguity at the fringes of 
"custody" and "interrogation," but the Court had taken a big step 
toward clarifying the ground rules of permissible interrogation. Mi-
randa's guidance also largely eliminated factors that, under the vol-
untariness approach, produced situations conducive to actual 
brutality.67 Moreover, Miranda eliminated, at least in principle, the 
due process test's built-in conflict between the police officer's duty to 
obtain a statement and his duty to respect the suspect's constitutional 
rights: the Court emphatically commanded the police to cease all 
questioning at the first sign of any desire to remain silent. The con-
flict, of course, persists below the surface because the officer will 
want to obtain a statement, but at least the Court tried to tell the 
police what, in theory, was expected of them. 
It is more difficult to find virtue in Miranda's response to the 
problems of appellate review under the voluntariness test. Of 
63. 384 U.S. at 473-74. 
64. 384 U.S. at 475. 
65. Several ACLU lawyers objected that Miranda had not gone far enough, because it did 
not mandate the presence of counsel. See pp. 47-49 n.11. 
66. See pp. 42-43 n.2 (questioning the Court's failure to differentiate between stationhouse 
interrogation and "custodial" questioning in the field or in the squad car). 
67. Of course, neither Miranda nor any other approach can render defiance of the law 
impossible. The most elaborate rules, even if complemented by thorough recording proce-
dures, probably cannot prevent use of the rubber hose "off camera." But Mir_anda outlawed 
the interrogation dynamics that easily lead to brutality; the voluntariness approach did not. 
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course, the new questions about whether "custodial interrogation" 
had occurred and whether proper warnings had been given were 
much more focused than the voluntariness inquiry and did not invite 
a balancing of subjective attitudes about the need for vigorous law 
enforcement. But the issue that normally arises next - whether a 
proper waiver had been obtained - was destined from the begin-
ning to be at the heart of the system of safeguards, and here the 
Court simply reintroduced, in slightly modified form, the inquiry 
into "voluntariness." The Court provided a few pointers,68 but the 
issue was defined primarily in terms of an unfocused assessment of 
the suspect's subjective state of mind under all the circumstances. As 
a result the Court not only left itself at the mercy of lower courts 
unsympathetic to constitutional safeguards, but more important, it 
failed to provide the many conscientious appellate judges with the 
framework for principled adjudication that had been lacking under 
the due process approach. 69 
How did Miranda contribute to reducing the amount of permissi-
ble interrogation pressures? In theory the opinion promised a great 
deal. Any custodial interrogation, no matter how brief or polite, was 
held to involve excessive pressure unless the suspect had received the 
Miranda warnings and had knowingly waived his right to remain 
silent. Moreover, the Court's safeguards (or any legislatively 
designed substitutes) were to be "adequate ... to dispel the compul-
sion inherent in custodial surroundings."70 Given the premise - es-
sential to the Court's holding and, in my view, convincingly 
documented - that extremely strong pressures are inherent in the 
custodial atmosphere, the remedial medicine obviously would have 
to be potent. Was the Court's prescription adequate to the purpose? 
By proclaiming that the suspect has rights that will be respected, the 
Miranda warnings probably do reduce in some measure the intimi-
dating tone of the interrogation proceedings. Yet when the suspect, 
though hopefully not yet "subjected to the techniques of persua-
sion," remains "swept from familiar surroundings . . . , surrounded 
68. The Court stated that evidence of threats, trickery, lengthy interrogation, or incommu-
nicado incarceration would suggest that a waiver was illegally obtained. See 384 U.S. at 476. 
69. The Court did offer one point of departure for the waiver analysis by referring to the 
standard for '·knowing and intelligent" waiver of the right to counsel under Johnson v. Zerbst, 
304 U.S. 458 (1938). See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966). But the analogy 
quickly broke down, and it may have been inevitably destined to do so because of critical 
differences between the rights being waived. The Court itself insisted, for example, that 
"[v]olunteered statements of any kind are ... not affected by our holding .... " 384 U.S. at 
478. As a result, the "right to remain silent" quite clearly could be lost inadvertently or unin-
telligently, and the right to counsel analogy was rendered inapplicable. 
70. 384 U.S. at 458. 
March 1981] Coefessions and the Court 881 
by antagonistic forces,"71 and particularly when the all-important 
warnings are delivered by those same "antagonistic forces," it is hard 
to see how the intimidation can be reduced very much. Indeed, the 
Miranda Court at one point seems to recognize as much, for in ex-
plaining the defendant's need for counsel the Court notes:72 
The circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate 
very quickly to overbear the will of one merely made aware of his priv-
ilege by his interrogators . . . . Our aim is to assure that the individ-
ual's right to choose between silence and speech remains unfettered 
throughout the interrogation process. A once-stated warning, deliv-
ered by those who will conduct the interrogation, cannot itself suffice 
to that end among those who most require knowledge of their 
rights. . . . Even preliminary advice given to the accused by his own 
attorney can be swiftly overcome by the secret interrogation process. 
Cf. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 485, n.5. Thus, the need for 
counsel to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege comprehends not 
merely a right to consult with counsel prior to questioning, but aJso to 
have counsel present during any questioning if the defendant so 
desires. 
Yet the Court implements this insight by merely requiring another 
once-stated warning - concerning the right to counsel. The entire 
passage just quoted collapses with the last five words, which condi-
tion the presence of counsel on the defendant's choice and assume 
that this choice can remain "unfettered" even when it must be made 
by an isolated defendant and then communicated to the very forces 
whose hostility has created the need for the protection in the first 
place.73 The Court could have done much better by insisting on the 
presence of an attorney during interrogation,74 or by requiring initial 
consultation with an attorney or friend, or even by mandating that 
warnings and waivers take place in the presence of a neutral magis-
trate who could break the wall of isolation and hostility surrounding 
the suspect.75 The Court did not even mention these alternatives. 
Miranda's promise for the weak and unsophisticated is closely 
linked to its prospects for dispelling the pressures of interrogation. 
By requiring that police inform all suspects of their rights, and by 
making clear that indigents too were entitled to the assistance of 
counsel (if they so desired), the Court went far toward correcting the 
appearance that the poor and the unsophisticated were particularly 
71. 384 U.S. at 461. 
72. 384 U.S. at 469-70. 
73. See pp. 92-93. 
74. This was the position of the ACLU. See pp. 47-49 n.l 1. The argument was developed 
in detail in the amicus brief filed by the ACLU in Miranda. 
75. Under this last alternative the Court also would have had to bar any questioning of the 
suspect before he receives the warnings in the magistrate's presence. 
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vulnerable to police exploitation. The manner in which police could 
deliver warnings and obtain waivers nevertheless promised that be-
neath the appearances, manipulation of the weak and vulnerable 
might continue. 
The subject of the "swearing contest" is saddest of all because 
this problem was the central obstacle to effective judicial control of 
the interrogation process. In Miranda itself the Court referred in 
several places to the problem of secrecy in police interrogation.76 
The Court even purported to explain the suspect's right to counsel by 
claiming that, among other things, an attorney's presence during 
questioning would help provide a reliable picture of what had oc-
curred during the interrogation.77 Yet Miranda does nothing what-
soever to mitigate the pitfalls of the swearing contest. The heralded 
warnings need not be given by a disinterested person, and the Court 
required no objective proof to corroborate claims that they were 
given in proper form by the police. The defendant's decision to 
waive his right to silence need not be made before a disinterested 
party or recorded in any fashion. Even the right to counsel, vaunted 
by the Court as a safeguard against police fabrication, can be 
"waived" by the suspect when he is isolated, in the privacy of the 
interrogation room, with only the police as observers. The most that 
can be said is that by requiring the prosecution to bear a "heavy 
burden" of proving waiver, and by dropping a strong hint about the 
State's ability to furnish objective corroboration,78 the Court was 
perhaps laying the groundwork for tackling the swearing contest in 
the future if police proved unwilling to take the hint. One has to 
wonder, however, whether in seeking a truly effective package of 
prophylactic rules, the Court should have started where Miranda 
starts and postponed what Miranda postponed. 
Kamisar probably would be the last person to deny these short-
comings. Yet his "Dissent from the Miranda Dissents" seems aston-
ishingly circumspect about these matters. He relegates to a three-
page footnote the complaints by a few civil liberties advocates that 
Miranda did not go far enough and the early reports about the ease 
with which police were obtaining waivers (pp. 47-49 n.11). His own 
view was that "[t]he Miranda Court required enough things 'at one 
gulp,' for me at any rate."79 In his later writings, criticism of Mi-
76. 384 U.S. at 445, 448. 
77. 384 U.S. at 470. 
78. 384 U.S. at 475. 
79. P. 49 n.11, quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, S02 (1966) (Clark, J., concurring 
and dissenting). Perhaps Kamisar wondered about the tactical consequences of a forthright 
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randa becomes more explicit. Indeed the lion's share of two full ar-
ticles is devoted to the all-important swearing contest. 8° Kamisar 
vividly exposes both the obvious and the more subtle problems here 
and shows how the difficulties could be avoided, without signifi-
cantly impairing any legitimate countervailing interest. 81 Yet even 
now Kamisar tends to be somewhat indirect in discussing Miranda's 
other weak points, 82 while he chooses instead to stress the basic con-
ceptual soundness of the Miranda approach. The most recent and 
most substantial of all his confessions pieces, covering more than one 
third of the book, is an extended criticism of the Court's choice of a 
sixth amendment focus in Brewer v. Williams, 83 and a plea for 
remembering Miranda, which "[w]hatever its shortcomings, ... 
tried to take the 'police interrogation'-'confession' problem by the 
throat" (p. 223). 
I am not so sure. Miranda undoubtedly serves important sym-
bolic functions. It also affords certain concrete advantages over the 
due process test, in terms of its guidance to the police, its partially 
effective safeguards for the suspect, and its somewhat more focused 
framework for judicial review. Miranda does not, any more than the 
due process test, come directly to grips with the dilemma arising 
from our simultaneous commitments to the privilege against self-in-
attack on the essential conservatism of Miranda. A demonstration that the Court really had 
not changed ver:y much might have deflated the foolish, but politically consequential, 1968 
outcry over "handcuffing" the police. But then, a forceful showing that Miranda's logic called 
for much more than the Court had required conceivably could have heightened fears that 
worse things were to come and thus strengthened the forces of political reaction. Perhaps 
Kamisar worried too about the responsibilities of the scholar (the committed scholar) under 
these circumstances. Most of us will be thankful that we did not face these dilemmas our-
selves. 
80. See Brewer v. Williams - A Hard Look at a JJiscomjiting Record, supra note 3; 
Kauper's "Judicial Examination of the Accused" Forty Years Loter, supra note 4. 
81. Ironically, however, a requirement that all interrogation sessions be recorded (or even 
that all "proceedings" be recorded, see p. 135) may be of little or no help in resolving the 
particular issue presented in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), the ver:y case Kamisar 
uses to develop his point. The police probably cannot be expected to have tapes rolling at (and 
before) the moment when a suspect unexpectedly "volunteers" information. If, as in Williams, 
they contend that the statements were made in that fashion, they will for the same reason have 
no tapes to produce; the question whether their failure to record was improper will tum on the 
same unverifiable testimony as the question whether there was "interrogation" in the first 
place. To make matters worse, the police may even point proudly to their failure to record as 
evidence that no interrogation was intended. Of course, these ironies in no way detract from 
Kamisar's basic point that when the police do intend to interrogate, the failure to make a 
complete recording is indefensible. 
82. Some problems arising out of Miranda's approach to waiver are mentioned, pp. 223, 
303 n.472, with primary emphasis again on "swearing contest" problems. Kamisar directly 
and forcefully addresses Miranda's failure to mitigate the pressures of custodial interrogation 
in connection with the discussion of the Kauper proposal for formal interrogation by a magis-
trate. Pp. 92-93. 
83. 430 U.S. 387 (1977). 
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crimination and to a law enforcement system in which police interro-
gation is perceived as a necessity. If anything, Miranda's technique 
for denying this dilemma, for insuring that we can have our cake and 
eat it, is infinitely less candid than the due process balancing analysis 
that Kamisar has justifiably attacked. Seen as a compromise, Mi-
randa is weU worth retaining. Whether Miranda represents the best 
possible compromise, and indeed whether compromise is required at 
all, remain open questions. 84 
C. The Sixth Amendment 
In Massiah v. United States, 85 decided two years before Miranda, 
the Court held inadmissible certain incriminating statements ob-
tained from an indicted defendant by an undercover informant. The 
defendant was not in custody when the statements were made, he 
was not even aware that he was talking to a government agent, and 
he faced virtually no significant pressure to speak under the circum-
stances. Neither due process nor fifth amendment concerns could 
justify exclusion of the statements. Yet six members of the Court, in 
an opinion by Justice Stewart (who would soon dissent in Miranda), 
held exclusion required by the different set of concerns underlying 
the sixth amendment. The Court reasoned that after the initiation of 
formal judicial proceedings (in this case by indictment), defendants 
are entitled to a lawyer's help at every stage of those proceedings. 
Because the government "deliberately elicited" incriminating inf or-
mation from the suspect in the absence of his attorney, it had de-
feated this right to assistance. 
Massiah was soon overshadowed by the controversial Escobedo 
and Miranda decisions and its potential was, as Kamisar puts it, 
"lost in the shuffle" (p. 160). Recently, however, the Court returned 
to Massiah in Brewer v. Wil!iams.86 Williams involved a direct con-
versation between the police and a murder suspect who had explic-
itly and repeatedly invoked his rights to silence and to counsel. 
Williams was arrested on murder and kidnapping charges, formally 
arraigned, and then driven across Iowa in police custody. During 
the ride Williams made incriminating admissions after a now-notori-
84. In a piece written four years before his plea for reinvigorating Miranda, Kamisar of-
fered intriguing suggestions for modifying present fifth amendment restrictions on formal testi-
monial compulsion and for replacing the Miranda safeguards with a system of official 
interrogation by a magistrate in the presence of counsel. Pp. 77-94. This approach, and partic-
ularly its capacity to satisfy the perceived "need" for confessions, seems well worth further 
exploration. 
85. 377 U.S. 201 (1964). 
86. 430 U.S. 387 (1977). 
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ous "Christian Burial Speech," in which a police captain pointed out 
the prospect of a heavy snowfall and stressed the danger that the 
young victim's body might never be found and properly buried with-
out prompt help from Williams. Because the captain had not asked 
Williams any direct question (in fact he told Williams, "I do not 
want you to answer me .... Just think about it. ... "),87 the lower 
courts had focused on the questions whether the speech constituted 
"interrogation" and whether Williams had waived his Miranda 
rights. The Supreme Court bypassed Miranda and held the state-
ments inadmissible under the sixth amendment Massiah doctrine. 
Why did the Court ignore Miranda and choose the Massiah 
route instead? This question, which both perplexed and troubled 
Kamisar, prompted the last and by far the longest of the pieces in 
this b_ook. 88 In a penetrating examination of both Miranda and Mas-
siah, Kamisar provides invaluable insight into the contrasting foun-
dations and distinct limits of the fifth and sixth amendment 
doctrines. Once more making brilliant use of numerous arresting 
hypotheticals, Kamisar identifies two ways in which Massiah af-
forded an easier route to reversal than Miranda: (1) Massiah bars 
e.ff orts to "deliberately elicit" information by any strategem and does 
not require "interrogation"; and (2) its basis in the sixth amendment 
suggests that any "waiver'' of the right to counsel should be tested by 
an especially stringent standard. Yet the Court made no reference to 
either of these advantages in Williams. Instead, it characterized the 
"Christian Burial Speech" as "tantamount to interrogation"89 and 
discussed the waiver problem in terms that would have been equally 
suited to analysis of fifth amendment rights. Given the Court's treat-
ment of the facts, reversal should have been a foregone conclusion 
under Miranda. In light of other indications of the Court's lack of 
enthusiasm for Miranda,90 its avoidance of Miranda in the Williams 
situation was "at least puzzling and at worst (for supporters of Mi-
randa, at any rate) downright ominous" (p. 202). 
Kamisar proceeds to show that anyone concerned about the po-
tential evils of police interrogation could take scant comfort from the 
revived status of Massiah. Although that doctrine is potentially 
broader than Miranda with respect to the "interrogation" and 
"waiver" problems, it is narrower in one crucial respect. Massiah 
rights come into play only after the onset of adversary judicial pro-
87. 430 U.S. at 393. 
88. What is Interrogation?, supra note 2. 
89. 430 U.S. at 400. 
90. See Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 SuP. CT. REV. 99. 
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ceedings. The Court has indicated that this does not occur merely 
upon arrest; rather, some formal litigation event, such as indictment, 
preliminary hearing, or arraignment seems to be required.91 
Kamisar offers a telling critique of this requirement92 and suggests 
several less arbitrary ways in which an appropriate line could be 
drawn, but concludes that the Court is committed to a relatively for-
malistic conception. As a result, law enforcement authorities may be 
free to manipulate the events that trigger Massiah rights. And in any 
event, the doctrine is simply unrelated to concerns about the fairness 
of an interrogation or the potential for coercion which it may in-
volve.93 The Miranda safeguards therefore remain essential to as-
sure adequate protection for constitutional rights during police 
interrogation. 
We now know that fear of the imminent demise of Miranda was 
premature. Without great enthusiasm, to be sure, the Court has ex-
plicitly reaffirmed Miranda ,94 and if the Justices still seem unlikely 
to embark on vigorous expansion of fifth amendment requirements, 
the Court probably will at least continue to tolerate Miranda's sub-
stance as it stands.95 This is not to say that Kamisar's fears were 
exaggerated. On the contrary, there is at least some evidence that the 
Court's subsequent decisions reaffirming Miranda may in some 
measure be ascribed to the simultaneously balanced and impas-
sioned argument developed so convincingly in Kamisar's article on 
91. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972) (plurality opinion). 
92. Pp. 210-24. Arguments in support of the formal line drawn by the Court are developed 
in Grano, Rhode Island v. Innis: A Need to Reconsider the Constitutional Premises l/nderl)'litg 
the Law of Coefessions, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. I, 25-31 (1979). 
93. Even after adversary judicial proceedings have begun, Massiah may afford a less satis-
factory standard of judgment than Miranda. Because Massiah applies when the government 
"deliberately elicits!' information, it has the advantage of making irrelevant the existence of 
"interrogation" pressures or the suspect's perception of an official demand to speak. On the 
other hand, the "deliberately elicit" test appears to make the governmental purpose critical; 
since the defendant himself has no direct knowledge of this, the "swearing contest" may not 
even be a contest. The Massiah standard may or may not be extended to situations in which 
the governmental purpose is equivocal or impossible to prove, see United States v. Henry, 447 
U.S. 264, 271 n.9 (1980); 447 U.S. at 277 n.• (Powell, J., concurring), but in any event the 
subjective elements of the test aggravate problems of proof that are already considerable. In 
contrast, the test of interrogation for Miranda purposes is essentially objective, see Rhode Is-
land v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 298-302 (1980). In practice the standard should prove somewhat 
less vulnerable to the difficulties of the swearing contest. For a discussion of the Innis and 
Henry decisions, see White, Interrogation Without Questions: Rhode Island v. Innis and United 
States v. Henry, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1209 (1980). 
94. See Tague v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469, 471 (1980) (per curiam). See generally Rhode 
Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980). 
95. See 446 U.S. at 304 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (''The meaning of Miranda has become 
reasonably clear and law enforcement practices have adjusted to its strictures; I would neither 
overrule Miranda, disparage it, nor extend it at this late date."). 
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Williams .96 
There remains, however, one plausible (and potentially "omi-
nous") reason, not mentioned by Kamisar, for the Court's preference 
for the Massiah route in Williams. Massiah afforded one advantage 
over Miranda, even on the Court's view of the facts, because Wil-
liams reached the Court in the context of a habeas corpus proceed-
ing. That procedural point assumes importance in light of Stone v. 
Powell ,97 decided eight months before Williams. In Stone, the Court 
had ruled that fourth amendment search and seizure claims may not 
be raised on federal habeas corpus if the state has provided an op-
portunity for full and fair litigation of the claim. Stone raised seri-
ous questions about what other kinds of constitutional claims 
similarly might be held unavailable on habeas. In Williams, two 
Justices mentioned the Stone problem, one in concurrence and one 
in dissent,98 and it must be said that neither Justice suggested any 
reason for treating Massiah claims differently from Miranda claims 
in the habeas context. Nevertheless, the status of Miranda claims on 
habeas seems far more precarious under the reasoning of Stone. 99 
The majority opinion in Williams omits any mention of Stone, 
presumably because the parties had not fully briefed the issue, 100 but 
it seems reasonable to speculate that at least some members of the 
Court would have had difficulty ignoring Stone's implications, if re-
liance had been placed on Miranda .101 The Court's decision in Wil-
liams to avoid that route thus could be read as darkening the shadow 
cast by Stone over the continued availability of Miranda claims on 
habeas. In any event Stone's independent implications are suffi-
ciently serious to warrant separate consideration of the role of the 
habeas remedy in an appropriate judicial response to the problems 
of confessions litigation. 
96, See 446 U.S. at 300 n.4. 
97. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 
98. Justice Powell, in concurrence, argued that the issue had not been adequately raised. 
See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 413-14 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring). Chief Justice 
Burger, in dissent, disputed this and, reaching the merits of the issue, concluded that both 
Massiah and Miranda claims should be barred on habeas. See 430 U.S. at 422-28 (Burger, 
C.J., dissenting). 
99. See text at notes 109-19 infra. 
100. See note 98 supra. 
101. Cf. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 n.11 (1977) (the Court indicated that if 
necessary to the disposition of the case, it might have considered extending Stone to Miranda 
claims, even though the prosecutor had not even raised the point). 
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II. CONFESSIONS IN FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS LITIGATION 
Stone v. Powel/102 bears witness to the Court's desire to promote 
more effective judicial administration by reshaping the machinery 
available for the resolution of constitutional claims. In sharply re-
stricting the availability of fourth amendment claims on habeas, the 
Court proceeded from the premise that these claims, unlike many 
other constitutional claims, "do not 'impugn the integrity of the fact-
finding process or challenge evidence as inherently unreliable; 
rather, the exclusion of illegally seized evidence is simply a prophy-
lactic device intended generally to deter Fourth Amendment viola-
tions ... .' " 103 The question therefore was whether the potential 
for habeas relief in the federal courts would add measurably to the 
deterrent effect of exclusion at trial or on direct review, and if so, 
whether any such added deterrence would justify the costs incurred 
in achieving it. In Stone the Court found "no reason to believe . . . 
that the overall educative effect of the exclusionary rule would be 
appreciably diminished if search-and-seizure claims could not be 
raised in federal habeas corpus review . . . ." 104 Moreover, the 
Court stressed that the costs of exclusion were substantial, not only 
because of the impact of the exclusionary rule on accurate fact-find-
ing whenever it is invoked, but also because of "societal costs [that] 
persist with special force" 105 in the habeas context: 
Resort to habeas corpus, especially for purposes other than to as-
sure that no iru;1pcent person suffers an unconstitutional loss of liberty, 
results in serious intrusions on values important to our system of gov-
ernment. They include "(i) the most effective utilization of limited ju-
dicial resources, (ii) the necessity of finality in criminal trials, (iii) the 
minimization of friction between our federal and state systems of jus-
tice, and (iv) the maintenance of the constitutional balance upon which 
the doctrine of federalism is founded." 106 
The Court's search for manageable tools for adjudicating confes-
sions claims inevitably will proceed beyond reexamination of inter-
rogation doctrine to similar questions about the proper scope of the 
habeas remedy in such cases. Yet, neither a due process claim nor a 
sixth amendment Massiah claim could plausibly be excluded from 
habeas under the reasoning of Stone. A due-process claim, unlike a 
fourth amendment claim, ordinarily does involve a direct "challenge 
102. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 
103. 428 U.S. at 479 (quoting Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 224 (1969)). 
104. 428 U.S. at 493. 
105. 428 U.S. at 495. 
106. 428 U.S. at 491 n.31 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 259 (1973) 
(Powell, J., concurring)). 
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[to] evidence as inherently unreliable." Moreover, the Court had 
held that use of an involuntary confession at trial impermissibly im-
pairs the integrity of the judicial proceedings even if the confession 
can be shown to be trustworthy. Thus in Mincey v. Arizona, 107 the 
Court held that a reliable but involuntary confession (unlike reliable 
search and seizure evidence) may not be introduced even for the lim-
ited purpose of impeachment. In light of decisions like Mincey there 
is little doubt that the Court would (and should) regard a voluntari-
ness claim as so central to the integrity of the judicial process that 
habeas relief must remain open even after full and fair litigation in 
the state courts. 108 
A sixth amendment Massiah claim is only slightly more vulnera-
ble under the reasoning of Stone. Admittedly, a Massiah violation 
will typically cast no doubt on the trustworthiness of the defendant's 
statements. Chief Justice Burger stressed this point in arguing in his 
Williams dissent that habeas relief should have been denied whether 
or not the Massiah claim was well-founded on the merits. 109 But the 
Massiah "exclusionary rule" is not merely a prophylactic device; it is 
not designed to reduce the risk of actual constitutional violations 
and is not intended to deter any pretrial behavior whatsoever. 
Rather, Massiah explicitly permits government efforts to obtain in-
formation from an indicted suspect, so long as that information is 
not used "as evidence against him at his trial." 110 The failure to ex-
clude evidence, therefore, cannot be considered collateral to some 
more fundamental violation. Instead it is the admission at trial that 
in itself denies the constitutional right. When the government has 
made an "end run" around counsel, or effected pretrial discovery in 
107. 437 U.S. 385 (1978). 
108. To the same effect is Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979), where the Court refused to 
extend Stone to a claim of grand jury discrimination. Such a claim casts no doubt upon fac-
tual guilt but still challenges the integrity of the proceedings in a fundamental way. Rose is 
not completely dispositive, however, because a grand jury claim is by nature much less likely 
to receive a sympathetic hearing in the state courts. See 443 U.S. at 563. See also Wainwright 
v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 n.11 (1977) (implying that Stone could not arguably be extended td a 
voluntariness claim). A decision to the contrary would require overruling Brown v. Allen, 344 
U.S. 443 (1953). 
109. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 425-26 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
110. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 207 (1964). Although the Massiah rule does 
not condemn post-indictment investigation as such, the decision does not necessarily authorize 
post-indictment efforts to elicit information in all cases. Rather, the Massiah Court explicitly 
limited its holding to the "circumstances here disclosed." 377 U.S. at 207. Since the defendant 
was "part of a large and well-organized ring" of drug smugglers under "continuing investiga-
tion" by federal agents, 377 U.S. at 206, a particularized need for further information had been 
shown. The Court in Massiah did not address the scope of permissible post-indictment inves-
tigation in the case of a defendant charged with a completed crime in which he apparently had 
acted alone. 
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disregard of the norms oflegitimate adversary procedure, it is wholly 
beside the point to claim that the evidence obtained by such tactics 
was reliable. Use of the evidence taints the judicial proceedings in a 
fundamental way, 111 and relief on habeas must remain open. 
Miranda claims seem much closer to search and seizure claims 
for purposes of applying Stone and denying habeas review. Of 
course, it could be argued that a Miranda violation poses a possibil-
ity of actual but unprovable involuntariness, and thus that Miranda 
violations involve an unacceptable risk of untrustworthiness. 112 But 
the Court has repeatedly rejected this view, holding in several differ-
ent contexts that a Miranda violation does not, in itself, impair the 
fact-finding process or in any other way impugn the integrity of judi-
cial proceedings.113 For example, a confession obtained in violation 
of Miranda can, like search and seizure evidence, be used for im-
peachment purposes if its reliability is established. 114 Moreover, the 
Court has repeatedly characterized Miranda as a set of prophylactic 
rules designed to deter unacceptable police behavior and to reduce 
the risk of actual constitutional violations. 115 Given the Court's as-
sumption in Stone that habeas relief is not useful in furthering such 
deterrence goals, the Court may consider the value of habeas relief 
in Miranda cases to be similarly outweighed by its costs. 
One major difference between Miranda claims and fourth 
amendment claims nevertheless should lead the Court to reject this 
analogy and to reaffirm the availability of Miranda claims in habeas 
cases. In search and seizure cases, the only plausible constitutional 
objection to the police behavior ordinarily must be based on the 
fourth amendment. II6 By foreclosing such claims on habeas, Stone 
makes a major contribution to the finality of litigation, helps con-
serve judicial resources, and reduces friction between state and fed-
111. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 556-57 (1977) (police undercover agent's partici-
pation in pretrial discussions between defendant and his attorney did not deprive defendant of 
a fair trial, as long as no information obtained by the agent was communicated to the prosecu-
tors). 
112. See Note, The Supreme Court 1965 Term, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 138-39 (1966). 
113. E.g., Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966) (nonretroactivity of Miranda). 
114. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). 
115. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 443-44, 446-47 (1974). 
116. A due process claim is extraordinarily difficult to establish in the search and seizure 
context. Compare Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 164 (1952), with Irvine v. California, 347 
U.S. 128 (1954). Such claims presumably remain open after Stone, although in delineating its 
holding, the Court (perhaps inadvertently) stated that after an opportunity for full and fair 
state litigation of a fourth amendment claim, federal habeas relief on grounds of "unconstitu-
tional search or seizure" is precluded. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482, 494 (1976). Com-
pare 428 U.S. at 495 n.37 ("we hold only that a federal court need not apply the exclusionary 
rule on habeas review of a Fourth Amendment claim .... ") (emphasis added). 
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eral courts. 117 Extending Stone to Miranda claims will produce none 
of these advantages, because a due process voluntariness claim nec-
essarily will remain open to the habeas petitioner. Such an extension 
of Stone would only shift primary attention at the habeas stage from 
Miranda to the open-ended due process standard. Whether defen-
dants or prosecutors would more often profit from this situation is 
unclear, but principled decision-making and effective appellate ad-
ministration undoubtedly would suffer. Indeed, the usual difficulties 
of the due process approach probably would be compounded by an 
extension of Stone. The shift of focus at the habeas stage from Mi-
randa to due process would tend to impede reliance on findings of 
fact in the prior state proceedings. 118 The voluntariness standard 
also would require more frequent resort to relatively subjective, ad 
hoc decision-making that would only enhance friction between the 
state and federal courts. Ironically, the extension of Stone to Mi-
randa claims would not even remove the Miranda issue from the 
case, except in a purely theoretical sense: the habeas court still 
would have to determine whether the interrogated suspect had been 
warned of his rights, because such warnings are recognized as an 
important factor in due process analysis of the totality of the circum-
stances.119 
Thus the extension of Stone would provide no added measure of 
finality to state criminal cases and would in the end complicate 
rather than simplify the habeas litigation that would necessarily con-
tinue. An extension of Stone to Miranda claims therefore seems un-
wise even if the deterrent effect of habeas review is considered slight. 
In habeas corpus as well as on direct review, Miranda remains useful 
as a tool for manageably adjudicating constitutional claims in con-
fessions cases. 
III. CONFESSIONS AND THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION 
Kamisar opened his first article on confessions with the observa-
tion that "[t]o discuss police questioning without knowing what such 
questioning is really like . . . is playing Hamlet without the 
117. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491 n.31 (1976). 
I 18. See, e.g., Taylor v. Cardwell, 579 F.2d 1380, 1382 (9th Cir. 1978). 
119. See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 516-17 (1963); .Developments in the Law, 
Confessions, supra note 29, at 981. Moreover, if warnings were not given, or given and not 
respected, a habeas court applying a voluntariness analysis normally would even have to de-
cide whether there was "custody" and "interrogation" within the meaning ef Miranda, because 
the failure of police to respect legal requirements is again recognized as an important factor in 
the totality of the circumstances. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 510 n.7 
(1963); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1959). 
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ghost." 12° Few people have done as much as Yale Kamisar has to 
bring us face to face with that reality. While Kamisar illuminates 
the analytical complexities of confessions doctrine with far more 
subtlety than most of the "legal minds" he loves to poke fun at, 121 he 
also constantly communicates a vivid sense of the human drama be-
hind the abstractions. 
Nevertheless, after nearly two decades of rapid, ostensibly "revo-
lutionary" legal development, the judicial doctrines relating to con-
fessions still seem far stronger on form than on substance. Kamisar 
justifiably lambastes Massiah as little more than a symbol, 122 but 
much the same must be said of Miranda; neither one delivers even a 
fraction of what it seems to promise. 
What should one properly expect of the Court? One can fairly 
question whether anything the Court might do in this area would 
change the underlying social and political realities very much. But a 
firm judicial determination to restrict interrogation severely or to 
prohibit it altogether probably could be enforced. Would this really 
be desirable? I am inclined to think that, given suitable alternatives 
to police interrogation, 123 such a step could be worth its potential 
costs, but it is easy to understand why fair-minded Justices might not 
feel sufficiently certain about the consequences. The best of them 
must feel sorely tempted to adopt a strong but largely symbolic 
stance, without seeking to intrude very much upon the hard worlds 
where investigators and high-volume penal administrators continue 
to attempt their impossible missions. 
If many of the Court's "reforms" are destined to be essentially 
symbolic, we will need to develop a much better understanding of 
how judicial reform functions on the symbolic level and how, if at 
all, its impact ultimately is felt. For similar reasons, the significance 
of judicial "retreat" may need to be assessed primarily from a sym-
bolic perspective. Indeed, anxious hand-wringing over each new 
technical loophole engrafted on Miranda by the Burger Court is, in 
terms of Miranda's practical effectiveness, supremely beside the 
point. Apart from their immediate consequences, however, such re-
treats convey a symbolic message of their own. The finer points of 
respect for individual rights are necessarily disparaged, the distinc-
tion between the desirable and the constitutionally permissible is in-
120. P. I (quoting Weisberg, Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons: A Skeptical View, in 
POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 153, 155 (C. Sowle ed. 1962)). 
121. See pp. 32, 56, 104. 
122. See pp. 212, 223-24. 
123. See note 84mpra. 
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evitably missed, and a certain amount of clear overreaching by 
police and prosecutors is, in the nature of things, encouraged. 
On the symbolic level, therefore, the Court has every reason to 
continue operating on the "high ground" of concern for those indi-
vidual liberties threatened by increasingly complex and powerful so-
cial institutions. The Court's symbolic steps, however piecemeal or 
imperfect, may prompt the kind of comprehensive legislative re-
sponse that, given the contemporary politics of crime control, is most 
unlikely to emerge without prodding from the judiciary. In the long 
run, the Court's efforts conceivably can help educate the thousands 
of front-line officials upon whose voluntary and comprehending 
compliance the constitutional order ultimately depends. 124 What the 
Court needs to carry out its educative mission is the continued sup-
port of those clear voices that articulate the best aspirations of a free 
society, that relentlessly expose the everyday world where those aspi-
rations have yet to penetrate, and that constantly call upon us to 
narrow the loopholes and exceptions that keep us distant from our 
goals. Kamisar's voice is among the best of that essential breed. 
124. q. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492 (1976) ("[O]ver the long term, [the] demonstra-
tion that our society attaches serious consequences to violation of constitutional rights is 
thought to encourage those who formulate law enforcement policies, and the officers who im-
plement them, to incorporate Fourth Amendment ideals into their value system.") (footnote 
omitted). Of course, that process of reshaping values is exceedingly complicated, at best. See, 
eg., J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966). 
